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by
Kieran A. Kennedy
The stated objective of the author is "to lay a bridge between
income accounting and welfare theory". There are two contrasting ways of
pursuing this objective. The first, in the realm of pure theory, examines
the relationship between welfare and hypothetical, perfect measures of
national product, while the second lies in the domain of national income
accounting with attempts to redefine concepts, extend data coverage and
improve measurement. Professor Romans’s attempt at bridge-building
begins in the realm of theory with the construction of a welfare maximisa-
tion model designed to establish the conditions in which it can be asserted
without ambiguity that net national product and welfare are moving in the
same direetion:
The model is a simple one, consisting of a two-person, two-
good, static, closed economy. Even within this narrow framework, the
conditions of correspondence between changes in NNP and in welfare are
dauntingly restrictive. When these restrictive conditions are relaxed one
at a time, in the direction of reality, there are few unambiguous statements
that can be made about the relationship between changes in NNP and in wel-
fare. In what appears to be the most optimistic and strong conclusion in
the paper, we are told that movements along the surface of the transforma-
tion curve always bring changes in the same direction in NNP and welfare,
no matter whether NNP is valued at the old or the new prices. But, in
fact, this conclusion is of limited help. Not only does it depend on the
..
other restrictive conditions holding, but also no one, in practice, has
given us a rule for distinguishing NNP changes that represent movements
along the transformation curve from those that represent movements inside
it, or’from those that represent shifts in the curve. The author may not
have intended his results to be operational, but, in that case, one may ask
what kind of ’bridge" he has built. If it is possible to establish a correla-
tion between NNP and welfare only under such limiting circumstances, one
cannot be hopeful about the emergence of a usable concept of NNP that always
and certainly moves with welfare. Moreover, we are still a long distance
away from being able to derive even a rough measure from this approach.
* I wish to aclmc~vledge the help received in preparing these comments from
John Martin, Nuffield College, Oxford, and my Institute colleagues, T. J.
Baker, R. Bruton, R. C. Geary and A. Dale Tussing.
.The possibility that NNP might never be capable of modifica-
tion to serve as a fully satisfactory welfare indicator, does not, of course,
mean that NNP and its components are not extremely useful in other con-
nections. I make this remark only because of the author’s somewhat
sceptical question as to why we bother to measure NNP if there is no
implied relationship between NNP and welfare. Regardless of whether or
not there is such a relationship, NNP and its components provide invaluable
information as a basis for many kinds of decisions o11 taxation, pricing,
investment, stabilisation policy, and a host of other activities necessary
for the functioning of society.
Having said that, however, it remains true that the very
existence of NN-P creates a strong temptation to associate it with welfare.
And, no doubt, we could hope for better decisions on taxation, pricing,
etc, if it were a closer approximation to welfare. The major alternative
approach to improving the correspondence between the two is the pragmatic
one of attempting to correct existing nleasures of NIN-P for the more serious
discrepancies. As is only too well Imown, the available measures of NNP
include some important items (e. g. pollution costs) and exclude others (e. g.
housewife’s work) that detract from its relevance to welfare measurement;
the methods of valuation leave much to be desired; and the absence of a
breakdown of NNP by significant distribution units is a grave obstacle to
the use of NNP in examining welfare changes. Efforts are being made
along these pragmatic lines, an important example being the Measure of
1Economic Welfare offered by Nordhaus and Tobin, which does not, however,
tackle the income distribution problem. The pragmatic approach also
raises formidable theoretical issues. A great deal more research and
debate will be necessary to arrive at the type of broad consensus needed
to establish such data on a regular, institutional, basis. Even then, of
course, there is no prospect of a measure that will conform to all the re-
quirements of the rigorous welfare theorist. Moreover, measures
developed for welfare purposes may not be the most suitable for other uses
of NNP, such as counter-cyclical policy. Nevertheless, I see great merit
in approaches along these lines, subject to certain reservations ez~oressed
below.
However, the fact that personally I would favour the prag-
matic approach as the one most likely to yield some useful practical results
in a reasonable time, does not mean that I regard Professor Romans’s
i. William D. Nordhaus and James Tobin: "Is Growth Obsolete?" in
Milton Moss (Ed.), The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance,
Studies in Income and Wealth No.38 (New York: NBER, 1973).
oapproach as having no value. Its major value, I think, lies in providing a
salutary reminder of the complexity of malting welfare evaluations. As
Professor Lancaster aptly put it in another paper read at this Conference,
one of the functions of theory is to keep everyone honest. This should have
two healthy effects on the pragmatists. First, it should act as a constant
stimulus to them not to rest content with any new measure. Secondly, it
should act as a walming not to elevate any one new measure into the measure
of welfare. Indeed, I feel that the objective of the pragmatists for the fore-
seeable future should be, not so much to gain institutional acceptance for
any single all-embracing welfare index, but to secure in the national accounts
framework much more of the Idnd of data that will facilitate empirical wel-
fare analysis. The illusion of the single answer could be dangerously
misleading when we are dealing with a complex, multidimensional problem.
National income accountants in the institutional setting must deal with
generally accepted concepts. It is unlikely, given Lhe confused state of
welfare theory itself, that any one generally-accepted welfare index could
emerge. There is no reason, however, why empirical welfare analysis
should not proceed as specific analytical projects. And, as in the case of
other forms of analysis, such as demand analysis, the task Of the national
income accountant is not to provide all the answers but as much material
as possible relevant to the task of finding answers. Even at the risk of
misuse, the data should ideally be presented in some systematic framework:
otherwise, as Professor Ruggles pointed out, it becomes difficult to cope
with the volume of such data.
While the pragmatist is proceeding along these lines, there
is still much to be done in extending the approach adopted by Professor
Romans. His paper draws attention to the drawbacks of formal welfare
theory. It is true that the first-best, necessary conditions for a Pareto
optimum are straightforward and rigorous: however, the real world is
clearly an imperfect, second-best world, and the corresponding conditions
for a second-best optimum are not nearly so clearcut even in simple models.
In developing his approach, the author might pay particular
attention to the social welfare function. This plays a key role in formal
theory: yet no attempt is made in this paper to explain where it comes
from and it is treated as given. This question has attracted much attention
in recent years. The social choice literature examines the necessary
assumptions for formulating social welfare functions and the logical con-
sistency of Paretian welfare economics with the various forms of such a
function.
oIn principle, a sociM welfare function could be derived from
one of three sources: (i) it could be determined outside society and imposed
on. it, e.g. by a dictator; (ii) it could be derived from the common prefe-
rences of the members of society; or (iii) as a consensus from the divergent
preferences of members. The first t~vo sources imply an absence of conflict,
while the final source most closely resembles the process of a democratic
society
In such a society, if there is any such thing as a social wel-
fare fltnction, there must exist some mechanism by which differences are
resolved and a single set of goals derived as the aim of society ~s a whole.
This means that a set of rules (e.g. a constitution) must be evolved for
transforming the conflicting objectives of all into a social choice. Arrowts
Impossibility Theorem shows that it is impossible to devise a constitution
that will overcqme the well-known voting paradoxes with simple majority
rule and also satisfy certain apparently desirable properties.
: However, subsequent attention has focussed on relaxing
some of the axioms and conditions of ArrowTs theorem so as to devise a
system of social ordering that will meet most oithe requirements. This
applies particularly to the conditions that require social preferences to be
derived entirely from the ordinal preferences of individuals. These con-
ditions accord with the neo-classieal concept that utility is purely ordinal;
but, if this cmi be suitably modified, the maximisation of aggregate utility
could constitute the basis for a complete social ordering. In this way,
systems of welfare weights, such as pioneered by Meade, might be used
to operationalise the social welfare function.
Even assuming that all this is satisfactorily accomplished,
however, we will still be faced with the problem of interdependence in
utility, which may be much more far-reaching than is commonly allowed,
and may provide the thorniest problem of all for welfare theory and
measure ment.
